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"I believe that there can be no truly just criminal law in the absence of
social justice-in other words, you can't have one without the other. "'
-Judge David Bazelon
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INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 1995 five members of the Tiny Rascals Gang, com-
posed primarily of young Cambodian men, broke into the San
Bernardino home of Henry Nguyen and held all of his family members
hostage. This home-invasion robbery, typical of Southeast Asian2 gangs,3
began as a quest to steal the valuables hidden within the Nguyen house-
hold, but ended up in a violent encounter that led to the deaths of five
members of the Nguyen family. Run Chhoun and Samreth Pan, two of
the gang members involved in the incident and high-ranking members of
the Tiny Rascals, were later arrested for this crime. They were found
guilty on multiple counts of first degree murder, sentenced to death, and
are now two of one hundred and twenty-three foreign nationals on death
row in the United States.4 The strategy pursued by the attorneys for
Chhoun and Pan included the presentation of evidence during trial that
described the tragic upbringing of the boys under the Khmer Rouge as
well as the difficult lives-economically, culturally, and educationally-
that they led after they were resettled in the United States.' The boys'
families were victimized during and after the Vietnam War, witnessed the
daily murder of their peers in the "killing fields" of Cambodia, were de-
tained in poorly run internment camps and came to the U.S. as "boat
people." '6 As such, the boys' lawyers argued that Chhoun and Pan came
2. I use the term "Southeast Asian" to refer to the community of individuals in the
U.S. who emigrated from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. I understand that these nations
and their peoples each possess distinct histories and may not necessarily identity them-
selves with one another. Indeed, some historically-based animosities may even exist among
these communities. Nevertheless, I refer to them commonly as Southeast Asians because
they still have much in common, including the experiences that form the foundation of
this Note's investigation. That is, the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong living
in the United States all suffered the ravages of the Vietnam War, were forced to flee their
homelands, and currently share a number of socioeconomic characteristics in common.
These communities also share the current challenge of confronting the rising number of
their youths joining gangs and involving themselves in delinquent behavior.
3. See infra Part I for a detailed discussion on Southeast Asian gangs and youth
involvement in crime.
4. See Mark Warren, Statistics: Reported Foreign Nationals on Death Row, USA, THE
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/
nationalsStats.cfi'n (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
5. Tim Grenda, 2 Men Face Trial in 5 San Bernardino Killings, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE,
April 19, 1999, at B1; Sothida Tan, Juvenile Crimes: Cambodian American Teens at Risk,
MODEL MINORITY: A GUIDE TO ASIAN AMERICAN EMPOWERMENT, Jan. 23, 2000, available at
http://modelminority.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=285.
6. Grenda, supra note 5. The term "boat people" refers to the thousands of South-
east Asian refugees, many from Vietnam, who escaped the post-war persecution of their
former homelands by boarding small boats and sailing despertely into the South China
Sea. See MARY TERRELL CARGILL'& JADE QUANG HUYNH EDs.,VOICES OF VIETNAMESE BOAT
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from very tragic backgrounds framed by their families' refugee experi-
ences.7 These arguments were presented in an effort to mitigate the
defendants' sentences, but as both young men are currently waiting on
death row, it is clear that this strategy was not successful.
Chhoun and Pan committed a series of terrible acts up to their
points of capture, including not only the San Bernardino murders, but
also other execution-style killings and robberies along the Pacific coast.
8
This probably contributed to the jury's lack of sympathy for their life sto-
ries and refugee experiences. However, by telling these stories and raising
them as a defense, Chhoun and Pan have touched upon an interesting
aspect of criminal law, raising a set of polemical questions about the mo-
rality of the criminal justice system as well as the criminal responsibility of
Southeast Asian defendants: how should Southeast Asians' emigrant legacy
of war-torn lives, necessitated evacuation, and generally poor socioeco-
nomic statuses in America influence the determination of their degree of
criminal responsibility? How about the American government's role in
initiating or perpetuating some of these conditions? The evidence pro-
vided by Chhoun and Pan was not unique to their families. Rather, these
two young men presented the stories of hundreds of thousands of refu-
gees and war-affected emigrants who have come to the United States
over the last three decades. Though Chhoun and Pan's crimes were
shocking to the conscience, so are the struggles of their families and those
of many other Southeast Asians, both in their postwar homelands and in
the United States.
This Note argues that certain Southeast Asian defendants should be
able to use their families' refugee experience as well as their own eco-
nomic and social marginalization in the U.S. as a partial excuse for their
criminal acts. This argument draws its strength from both the socioeco-
nomic deprivation of much of the Southeast Asian community and the
linking of this reality to a careful analysis of the moral foundations of the
criminal law. In essence, the American criminal justice system, which
draws much of its moral force to punish from the theory of retributivism,
cannot morally justify the full punishment of a large portion of the
Southeast Asian community. It is precluded from doing so by American
society's contribution, in one form or another, to many of these defen-
dants' criminal conduct.
PEOPLE: NINETEEN NARRATIvEs OF ESCAPE AND SURVIVAL 4 (2000); JEREMY HEIN, FROM
VIETNAM, LAos, AND CAMBODIA: A REFUGEE EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 35-37
(1995). These individuals hoped to find shelter in refugee camps and eventually make their
way to new host countries. Thousands, however, died at sea from starvation, sickness, and
attacks by pirates. CARGILL & HuYNH at 4. According to one report, the number of deaths
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More than just arguing for the mitigated conviction or sentencing
of Southeast Asian defendants, this Note seeks to reveal and draw main-
stream America's attention to the severe economic and social deprivation
of hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians across the country. By high-
lighting the way that the American government has historically mistreated
poor and immigrant populations in general, and the Southeast Asian
community in particular, it becomes clear that the only way that society
can regain its moral prerogative to punish is by implementing reform pro-
grams that will provide Southeast Asian emigrants and their families with
a real, as opposed to a circumscribed, opportunity to achieve various types
of social, economic, and political success in America.
In Part I, I provide some context on Southeast Asian involvement in
crime. In attempting to reveal the reality behind the myth of the model
minority, I examine the rising rates of Southeast Asian delinquency and
involvement in gangs, focusing primarily on the behavior of Southeast
Asian youths. Part II examines the U.S. government's role in creating a
large community of poor Southeast Asians, the most vulnerable of which
are currently living in highly criminogenic environments. This section
links the present condition of many Southeast Asians to the Vietnam War
and subsequent government policies regarding refugees, immigrants, and
the distribution of welfare benefits. Finally, in Part III, I connect the
Southeast Asian experience to a discussion of the morality of the criminal
law, and lay out the justification for a partial excuse for Southeast Asian
defendants based on societal fault. This discussion draws on retributivist
notions of just deserts and proportionality in punishment. It also high-
lights the work of intellectuals such as Judge David Bazelon, as well as
Richard Delgado and his Rotten Social Background (RSB) defense, in
arguing that a truly moral criminal justice system allows for a defense
based on societal fault and society's contribution to the conditions which
lead to an individual's decision to break the law.
1.THE RISING RATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN CRIME
AND YOUTH DELINQUENCY
In the United States today, an Asian American youth is arrested for a
violent crime every seven hours.9 Many of these young men and women
are Southeast Asian. This section discusses the involvement of Southeast
Asians, and particularly Southeast Asian youths, in gangs and other forms
of delinquent and criminal behavior. It examines contemporary trends
and statistics, provides a detailed description of how a Southeast Asian
gang operates, and explores some of the literature on why Southeast Asian
9. IssuEs, NATIONAL ASIAN AMERICAN PACIFIC ISLANDER MENTAL HEALTH AssocIA-
TION, http://www.naapimha.org/issues/index.htnil (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
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youths become involved with crime. In doing so, this section establishes
that, despite common public perceptions, Southeast Asian crime is a seri-
ous problem both within the Southeast Asian community and for
American society at large.
A. Crime Among Southeast Asian Youths
Due to the prevalence of popular stereotypes, and the image of
Asian Americans as the model minority,"' the problem of Asian American
youth involvement in crime and other forms of delinquency have gone
unnoticed by much of the country, as well as within the academic litera-
ture on criminology and the law." Delinquency among young Asian
Americans, however, is a real problem. Over the last twenty years, the
number of Asian American youths within the juvenile justice system has
increased dramatically while national arrest rates for all other racial groups
have decreased substantially. 2 During this period, the arrest rate for Asian
American youths increased by 11.4%.13
Within the greater Asian American umbrella, Southeast Asians have
been particularly affected by the involvement of their young men and
women in various types of criminal conduct. 14 While large scale national
studies that collect and disaggregate data on individual Asian ethnic
groups are non-existent, due in large part to the conception of Asian
America as an undistinguishable mass of similar peoples," smaller studies
focused on specific Southeast Asian communities are available. These stud-
ies reveal much of the differences among Asian American subgroups and
their involvement in crime.
One of these studies focused on Asian Americans in Alameda County,
California. It reported that between 1991 and 2000, of all of the Asian eth-
nic groups, Vietnamese youths were the most represented in arrest,
10. This common and much discussed stereotype presents the Asian American ex-
perience as a model success story and the epitome of the "American Dream." It identifies
all Asian Americans as intelligent, obedient, and hard working. It also pits Asian Americans
against other racial and ethnic minorities by comparing the supposed successes of the
Asian American community with the struggles of others. Like all stereotypes and heuristic
devices, however, the image of the model minority over-simplifies the realities of the di-
verse peoples that make up the greater Asian American community, and masks the
numerous struggles that Asian Americans continue to face today. See, e.g., RONALD TAKAKI,
STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHomi:A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 474-84 (1998).
11. See Thao Le, Delinquency Among Asian/Pacific Islanders: Review of Literature and
Research, 15 THE JUST. PROF'L 57, 59 (2002).
12. Id. at 57.
13. THE SERVICES AND ADVOCACY FOR ASIANYOUTH CONSORTIUM, MOVING BEYoND
EXCLUSION: FOCUSING ON THE NEEDS OF ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER YOUTH IN SAN FRAN-
CISCO 26-27 (2004) [hereinafter MOVING BEYoND EXCLUSION].
14. See Le, supra note 11, at 58.
15. MOVING BEYoND EXCLUSION, supra note 13, at 1.
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adjudication and institutionalization statistics. 16 It also found that Laotian
and Vietnamese juveniles ranked among the top four groups for the num-
ber of unique individuals arrested per thousand at 73.8 and 41.9
respectively, behind only the rates for Samoans and African Americans.
17
Meanwhile, a study conducted in Oakland found similarly alarming
results concerning the Southeast Asian community. After disaggregating
data by specific Asian ethnic groups, it became clear that Southeast Asian,
along with Pacific Islander youth in Oakland, were noticeably more in-
volved in the juvenile justice system than other Asian ethnic groups such
as the Chinese or Japanese.' 8 Vietnamese and Laotian youths had among
the highest arrest rates in the city, behind only that of young African
Americans.' 9 Consistent with records from other jurisdictions, felony
property crimes made up the large majority of offenses for which Asian
American and Pacific Islander youths were arrested.20
The two localized studies discussed above reveal that, contrary to
common perceptions, a large number of Asian American youths are en-
gaged in criminal activities, starting from a very early age. While the
mainstream discussion on youth involvement in crime focuses promi-
nently on African Americans and Hispanics, it improperly excludes and
marginalizes the problem of juvenile delinquency among Asian Ameri-
cans, especially within the Southeast Asian community. Although the
studies on Alameda County and the City of Oakland have a seemingly
local nature that may not be generalizable to the national Asian American
population, the fact that a large number of Asian Americans in general,
and Southeast Asians specifically, live in California suggests that the two
innovative studies present a realistic and much needed description of the
criminal lifestyles of Southeast Asians beyond just Northern California.
However, less formal data from around the country are available, which
nicely complement the findings from the two studies above.
In just about every part of the country where there is a sizeable
Southeast Asian population, one will find problems of youth involvement
in crime and gangs. Minnesota has one of the largest Southeast Asian
communities in the country outside of California, and has a particularly
large population of Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong.2' Consequently, it
16. ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER YOUTH VIOLENCE PREVENTION CENTER, NOT INVISIBLE:
AsiAN PACIFIC ISLANDER JUVENILE ARRESTS IN ALAMEDA COUNTY 5 (2001).
17. Id.
18. NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: ASIAN
AND PACIFIC ISLANDERYOUTH IN OAKLAND 4 (2003).
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id.
21. See Steve Miller, Racial Abuse Linked To Hunter Shooting, WASH.TIMES,January 30,
2005, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050130-123456-1371r.htm. St.
Paul, Minnesota has the highest concentration of Laotian refugees in the Unites States.
[VOL. 11:671
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has also witnessed a rapid boost in Southeast Asian gang membership and
violence over the last ten years. In 1999, in little more than a month, the
Minnesota Gang Strike Force recorded roughly twenty-seven different
drive-by shootings and one beating involving Asian gangs in the Twin
Cities area, which led to the deaths of two people and the wounding of
several more.22 These shootings, and others, involved primarily youngS 23
members of the Hmong community. As evidenced by these drive-bys,
the growing numbers of Hmong, Laotian, and Cambodian gangs in Min-
nesota have been accompanied by a growing tendency for violence as
well. Indeed, youth workers in the area report that gang members often
carry and fire handguns, steal, do drugs, drink alcohol, and run prostitu-
24tion rings.
The growth of Southeast Asian crime is not only measurable by the
number of young men and women joining gangs and entering detention
centers, but can also be seen as a geographical phenomenon. That is, not
only has the number of Southeast Asians involved in criminal behavior
increased, so has the number of cities and locations where these delin-
quent youths gather. Southeast Asian gang activity in Minnesota has
spread across various parts of the state, and has even begun to move into• . 25
Wisconsin. In California, intrastate migration has occurred. As recently
as 2002, a number of the members of the Tiny Rascals Gang moved from
Long Beach to Fresno, becoming one of about eighteen Southeast Asian
, 26gangs in that city. This move created an "unbalance of power," a rivalry
with another local gang, and led to a series of shootings and deaths.27 Fi-
nally, it is important to note that a number of Southeast Asian gangs have
developed national affiliates and a national presence. They have become
more than just local phenomena and spread to all parts of the country.
The Easy Boys Gang, which originated as a street gang in Long Beach has
mobilized enough support to establish a presence in Massachusetts and
make it onto a list of"security threat groups" compiled by the Massachu-
setts Department of Correction.28 Similarly, the Tiny Rascals Gang has
extended its membership beyond just Long Beach, Fresno, and other parts
of California, and has been known to frequent cities such as Lawrence
Additionally, it has an estimated Hmong population, both foreign and U.S.-born, of
60,000. Id.
22. Lourdes Medrano Leslie, Solutions Sought for Increase in Asian Gang Violence in
Twin Cities, STARTRIsB.,Aug. 12, 1999, at lB.
23. Id.
24. Kimberly Hayes Taylor, Social Workers See Rise in Asian Youth Violence, STAR TiB.,
July 25, 1995, at B6.
25. Id.
26. Louis Galvan, Police Link Asian Gangs to Violence, The FRESNO BEE, Sept. 14, 2002,
at B1.
27. Id.
28. OTHER GA aGs IDENTIFIED, GANG SECURITY THREAT GROUP INFORMATION, avail-
able at http://www.mass.gov/doc/GANG/othgang.htm.
SPRING 2006]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
and Brockton, Massachusetts; Brattleboro, Vermont; Portland and Sanford,
Maine; as well as towns throughout Connecticut.
29
In short, Southeast Asian crime, youth delinquency, and gang in-
volvement are on the rise. This has been a national rather than just a local
trend, and has not been limited to areas such as Northern California
where a large number of Southeast Asians have traditionally settled and
migrated over the years.
B. A Closer Look: Bui Doi Southeast Asian Gangs and "Home Invasions"
In order to obtain a stronger understanding of the severity and
pressing nature of the problem of crime within the Southeast Asian com-
munity, it would help to take a closer look at the basic structure and
strategies employed by bui doi Southeast Asian gangs. While certainly not
representative of all Southeast Asian criminal defendants, members of bui
doi gangs have been responsible for a large number of crimes over the last
two decades and provide a great deal of insight on the unique and violent
301nature of most Southeast Asian gangs.
In California, bui doi (translated as "dirt in the wind" in Vietnam-
ese)31 gangs operate rather differently from other ethnic groups. 32 Rather
than seeking to obtain and defend local turf from other gangs, the bui doi
follow a delocalized set of practices. 3 They move from place to place
where fellow Southeast Asians are located, spend a large part of their lives
sleeping and planning robberies in motels,34 and oftentimes pick up and
29. Id.
30. While this section provides a quick overview of bui doi gangs, it is important to
keep in mind the basic fact that not all Southeast Asians that commit crimes are members
of gangs. This distinction is important for two reasons. First, it helps mitigate some of the
negative effects of a newly developing media image that depicts Southeast Asian youths,
who somehow failed to live up to the expectations of the model minority, as part of a
rising "Southeast Asian crime wave." Michael Peter Smith & Bernadette Tarallo, Who Are
the "Good Guys"? The Social Construction of the Vietnamese "Other", in THE BUBBLING CAUL-
DRON: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE URBAN CRisis 64-65 (Michael Peter Smith & Joe R.
Feagin eds., 1995). Second, and more importantly, this distinction reminds society that the
problem of crime within the Southeast Asian community runs deep and goes far beyond
just organized criminal behavior to also include the activities of thousands of young
Southeast Asians who engage daily in independent delinquent behavior.
31. Bui doi Southeast Asian youths were given the name "dirt in the wind" in order
to reflect many of their life experiences as "rootless vagabond[s], separated from household
social structure and 'normal' family life by war, migration, and an orphaned existence in
violent, chaotic, and unsafe refugee camps." See id. at 65-66.
32. Id. at 69.
33. Id.; Ruby Gonzalez, Asian Gangs Latest Threat Sweeping the Neighborhood, PASA-
DENA STAR NEWS, Sept. 26, 2004, at A10.
34. Smith and Tarallo, supra note 30, at 69.
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drop off members as they move from one town to another."5 Bui doi gangs
consist primarily of Vietnamese and ethnic-Chinese Vietnamese members,
but some of these gangs have come to include Cambodians, Laotians, and
36
Amerasians.
Bui doi gangs are known most for their home invasion robberies of
other Southeast Asian families. During these invasions, oftentimes violent,
the gang breaks into a family's household or small business, ties up and
takes hostage all of the family members present, and terrorizes them until
they produce valuables or money.37 The tactics used include beatings, tor-
ture, and rape.38 Home invasions are carefully planned out, taking into
account such diverse considerations as the number and placement of
phones in the target home, the acquisition of "cold" backup cars, and the
placement of lookouts throughout the neighborhood. 39 Bui doi gangs have
had high levels of success because they prey on members of their own
ethnic communities by exploiting their knowledge of the cultural misun-
derstandings that make the least adapted segments of these communities
extremely vulnerable to crime.4° Unfamiliar with or untrusting of banks
and the local police, the victims of most home invasions have the dual
disadvantage of keeping large amounts of valuables stored within their
homes and being afraid to seek police protection. Southeast Asian gangs
draw on their knowledge of these facts to quickly and brutally stage a
robbery and then move on to another target neighborhood as quickly as
they arrived to the first.
C. The Environmental Roots of Southeast Asian Crime
A number of researchers have tried to explain the involvement of
Southeast Asian youths in criminal and other forms of delinquent behav-
ior.42 Amongst these, the most compelling arguments have been offered by
35. DOUGLAS D. DAYE, A LAW ENFORCEMENT SOURCEBOOK OF AsiAN CRIME AND
CuLTuREs:TACTICS AND MiNDsETs 244 (1997).
36. Id.; The term "Amerasian" refers to the offspring of Southeast Asian women and
American men stationed in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. This Note talks more
about Amerasians and their difficult lives after the evacuation of American troops in Part
III(A), infra.
37. C.N. Le, Asian American Gangs, ASIAN-NATION: THE LANDSCAPE OF ASIAN AMER-
ICA,Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.asian-nation.org/gangs.shtml
38. Id.
39. DATE, supra note 35, at 244-45.
40. Smith & Tarallo, supra note 30, at 69.
41. Le, supra note 37.
42. See generally Le, supra note 37 (assessing the wide range of approaches that have
been used to explain delinquency among Asian American youths including: psychological
factors, victimization, acculturation and cultural conflict, peer and family relations, psycho-
cultural elements, integration failure, ecology and social structure, the immigration process,
and resiliency and protection).
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those who believe that Southeast Asian criminality results primarily from
environmental factors such as social and economic inequality, as well asS • 43
racial discrimination. According to Bankston and Zhou, Southeast Asian
adolescents choose to behave antisocially and commit crimes because they
live in frustrated, low income neighborhoods where their opportunity
structures are limited, and they frequently come into contact with and
44learn from existing criminogenic subcultures. Kent and Felkenes reach a
similar conclusion through a series of multivariate analyses based on data
gathered from the Little Saigon area ofWestminster, California, the largest
local community ofVietnamese Americans in the country. In their study,
Kent and Felkenes conclude that the presence of gangs in residential
neighborhoods and positive attitudes toward gangs among youths are the
two strongest factors that explain Vietnamese gang involvement.4 ' Both
the work of Bankston and Zhou, and Kent and Felkenes, show that by
living in low-income neighborhoods and possessing generally low socio-
economic statuses, Southeast Asian youths encounter a circumscribed
opportunity structure (poor public schooling and limited job opportuni-
ties)46 that makes them vulnerable to the pressures of local gangs and their
concomitant sub-cultures of crime.
4 7
Research conducted for the use of law enforcement agencies also
supports the conclusion that Southeast Asian youth involvement in crime
derives largely from environmental factors. Consistent with the work of
Kent and Felkenes, this research finds that Asian youths who join gangs
43. In making this claim I do not mean to suggest that social and economic depri-
vation are the sole factors responsible for criminal conduct among Southeast Asians and
among America's poor population generally. Indeed, other factors such as acculturation
issues and cultural conflict almost definitely also play a role in Southeast Asian emigrant
struggles, and the choice to join a gang or commit a criminal act. HIEN Duc Do, THE
VIETNAMESE AMERIcANs 61 (1999); See Le, supra note 37, at 60-62. What I argue is that
theories and research based on the link between America's social structure and crime pro-
vide the strongest and most compelling explanation for Southeast Asian criminal behavior.
Moreover, detailed studies have found that non-cultural factors are more predictive of
Southeast Asian gang involvement than culturally based ones. DouGLAs R. KENT &
GEORGE T. FELKENES, U.S. DEP'T oF JUSTICE, CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS FOR VIETNAMESE
YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN STRmEr GANGS 82 (1998).
44. Carl L. Bankston & Min Zhou, Valedictorians and Delinquents: The Bifurcation of
Vietnamese American Youth, 18 DEVIANT BEHAV.: AN INTERDisc. J. 343, 347 (1997); But see
Darnell Hawkins, Crime and Ethnicity, in THE SocIo-ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
108-11 (Brian Frost ed., 1993) (questioning the strength of theories explaining criminal
activity among ethnic minorities based solely on an economic-deprivation/inequality
perspective).
45. KENT & FELKENES, supra note 43, at 82.
46. Bankston & Zhou, supra note 44, at 345-47.
47. The socioeconomic struggles of the Southeast Asian community will be dis-
cussed in detail infra, in Part II(B).
[VOL. 11:671
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typically grow up within or near gang subcultures.8 It also explains that
most Asian gang members are poorly educated, have few qualifications for
most jobs, have serious socioeconomic deficiencies, and have been ex-
posed to racism and cross-cultural violence.4 9
These findings discussed above provide empirical support for two
powerful theories often advanced to explain the different levels of crimi-
nal conduct among and within different ethnic and racial groups. These
two theories, Robert Merton's social strain theory and Edwin Suther-
land's theory of differential association, point to the social structure and to
an individual's socioeconomic standing in order to account for different
frequencies of criminality across groups.
According to the social strain theory, society has a set of dominant
values and goals, but not everyone has the ability to achieve these values
and goals. 0 A number of factors may stand in the way of an individual's
ability to meet society's expectations including unemployment, the lack of
a good education, and various forms of racial discrimination. 51 When
there is a gap between society's values and an individual's circumstances,
he will respond in any of a number of antisocial ways-rebellion, re-
treatism, or innovation-oftentimes resorting to criminal conduct. s2 With
respect to many Southeast Asian youths, their upbringing in low-income
neighborhoods, substantial educational deficiencies, and lack of highly
sought after work skills frustrate their abilities to achieve the values and
goals advanced by mainstream society. As such, Merton's theory suggests
that they will react negatively and pursue alternative methods of fulfill-
ment or retreatism that will often lead them into trouble with the law.
Sutherland's differential association theory argues that criminal be-
havior is learned behavior.13 The more contact a person has with people
who are already involved with crime (e.g. gangs or non-gang affiliates of
criminogenic youth sub-cultures), the more likely that person will choose
to engage in criminal activity himself.s4 This theory is consistent with Kent
and Felkenes' finding that growing up in disadvantaged communities that
have strong gang presences or positive attitudes toward criminal behavior
explains much of the involvement of Southeast Asian youths in crime.
48. DAYE, supra note 35, at 98.
49. Id.
50. SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN
AMERICA 73 (2d ed. 2000).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 73-74. Professor Walker relates Robert Merton's definition of"retreatism"
as a rejection of both society's goals and the accepted means of achieving them. The term
"rebellion" is explained in a similar manner except with the added caveat that those who
rebel also attempt to create a new society with its own set of goals and values. Finally,
Walker describes Merton's use of "innovation" as "an acceptance of society's goals but a
rejection of the accepted means of attaining them." Id. at 74.
53. Id. at 74.
54. Id.
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In summary, research on Southeast Asians has found that many
members of this community commit crimes not because of any unique
cultural or individual factors that predispose them to such action, but as a
consequence of their very low socioeconomic statuses and difficult lives
of deprivation. These explanations rest on theories of necessity, frustration,
and sub-cultural rebellion. Social scientists have made such observations
for over a century with communities of all different ethnicities and races,
linking social and economic deprivation to criminal behavior. Within the
context of immigrant populations, they have consistently presented the
following set of arguments:
(1) The economic and social marginality of ethnic newcom-
ers, as compared to natives or more settled immigrants,
resulted in a greater likelihood of their engaging in
criminal conduct.
(2) Such marginality (due to poverty, deprivation) rather
than any persisting social characteristics unique to a given
ethnic population accounts for the comparative over-
involvement in crime found among some groups.
(3) As members of various ethnic/immigrant groups im-
prove their comparative economic status, their rate of
involvement in crime will be reduced, thus reducing the
gap between their ethnic grouping and others who pre-
ceded them. s
Research on Southeast Asian youths and their involvement in crime is
consistent with these observations.
Certainly, not all Southeast Asian criminal defendants come from
broken homes or live in poverty.-6 In reality, though, far more Southeast
Asian defendants come from backgrounds of economic and social struggle
than from backgrounds of privilege or middle-class status. As such, this
section has argued that socioeconomic deprivation and life in crimino-
genic environments are the paramount factors that explain Southeast
Asian criminality. In conjunction with the next part of this Note, which
identifies American society's role in placing many Southeast Asian emi-
grants within such environments of deprivation and erecting barriers to
upward mobility, the arguments presented here suggest that society should
share part of the blame for the Southeast Asian defendant's criminal acts
and, in fact, must do so in order to legitimately claim that its system of
criminal law is moral and just.
55. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 98.
56. Gonzalez, supra note 33. The author provides the following example: "David
Evangelista, an Asian Boyz [gang] member, got straight A's in school, volunteered at a hos-
pital and delivered jewelry while he was involved in a five-month crime spree in 1995 that
left seven people dead." Id. at Al0.
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II. SOUTHEAST ASIAN CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
SOCIETY'S TENUOUS MORAL AUTHORITY TO PUNISH
Having discussed the contemporary involvement of Southeast Asians
in both organized crime and unorganized delinquent behavior, I will now
explain how the U.S. government is responsible--directly and indi-
rectly-for the emigration of over a million Southeast Asians to the U.S.
57over the last twenty-five years, and for the settlement of many of these
individuals in criminogenic environments. I will then argue that because
of these facts, a truly moral system of criminal law, based on the retribu-
tivist concepts of just deserts and proportionality, requires that Southeast
Asian defendants negatively affected by America's foreign and domestic
policies receive mitigated punishments based on the use of a societal fault
defense. Such a thesis is supported through an assessment of the U.S. gov-
ernment's role in uprooting Southeast Asians from their homelands and
then subsequently leaving them to fend for themselves in a new country
where many of them lacked and still lack the financial resources, educa-
tion, and language skills to lead a life outside of poverty and away from
crime-plagued neighborhoods.
A. Life in America as a Necessity, Not a Choice
By choosing to wage an ideological war in Southeast Asia, and then
evacuating after nearly three decades of fighting, the United States bears a
large degree of responsibility for both the destruction of the economy
and traditional life of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and for the forced
exodus of millions of Southeast Asian refugees and immigrants. Immedi-
ately after the fall of Saigon in 1975, roughly 130,000 Southeast Asians
fled their devastated homelands to the United States. 8 Having fought on
the side of the American forces that lost the war, many of these refugees
57. By the year 2000, the United States had a Vietnamese population of roughly
1.12 million, as well as a rather sizeable community of 169,429 Hmong, 168,707 Laotians,
and 171,937 Cambodians. JESsIcA S. BARNES & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, US CENSUS Bu-
mAu, THE ASIAN POPULATION: 2000 9 (FEB. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2002pubs/c2kbr0l-16.pdf.These communities include a number ofAmerican-born
individuals, but the families represented have almost all shared and felt the impact of the
refugee experience. Even though the official number of individuals recognized as refugees
dropped throughout the 1980s and 90s, many of the individuals who have come to the
United States under normal immigrant statuses have been just as affected by the war as
those given refugee status. The terms "refugee" and "economic migrant" do not really
distinguish between the real life experiences of the Southeast Asians given each title.
Rather, they represent international and domestic political considerations more than any-
thing else. See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES &
AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR 198-205 (1986).
58. Ruben G. Rumbaut, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian Americans, in ASIAN
AMERICANS: CONTEMPORARY TRENDS AND ISSUES 240 (Pyong Gap Min ed., 1995).
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left their homes in order to avoid persecution from the new Communist
regimes. This was the case with the Hmong, who aided the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in an illegal war in Laos by serving in paramilitary units
and rescue teams. But for the presence of American forces in Southeast
Asia and their recruitment of Hmong villagers, the Hmong would not
have faced the type of extreme genocidal persecution that they did at the
hands of the postwar Laotian government. 9 Similarly, in Vietnam many of
the individuals associated with the South Vietnamese government and
military were sent to re-education camps that were, in reality, prison and
labor centers.60
In addition, many Southeast Asians had no choice but to emigrate
because their homes and prewar lives were destroyed, and their countries'
economies were in shambles. The war left Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
among the three poorest countries in the world.61 In Vietnam, the war led
6?to mass poverty and food shortages. Extensive malnutrition became a
national problem, affecting over 40% of Vietnamese children even as late
as the 1990s.63 The nearly three decades of fighting also internally dis-
placed a third of the South Vietnamese population, eliminated over half of
South Vietnam's forest area, left the residue of over 11 million gallons of
the toxin Agent Orange, uprooted a third of the Hmong population in
Laos, and contributed to the deaths of as many as a quarter of the people
of Cambodia." Those who did not die from gunfire, starvation, or napalm
suffered the consequences of years of almost continuous bombing raids
that placed large craters into the Southeast Asian countryside and elimi-
nated entire towns. One estimate found that over a nine year period,
more than two million tons of bombs were dropped on Laos, with an
average of one bombing raid every eight minutes. 65 Thus, with their gov-
ernments fallen, their homes destroyed, and their local economy in
shambles, hundreds of thousands of refugees came to the United States,
not because they wanted to, but out of necessity created by an American
war fought on Southeast Asian soil.
59. Victor M. Hwang, The Hmong Campaign for Justice: A Practitioners Perspective, 9
AsiAN UJ. 83, 101 (2002).
60. Do, supra note 43, at 61.
61. Rumbaut, supra note 58, at 236.
62. JAMES M. FREEMAN & NGUYEN DINH Huu, VOICEs FROM THE CAMPSVIETNAMESE
CHILDREN SEEKING ASYLUM 7 (2003).The problem with food shortages was enhanced by
the policies of the new Communist government, which included confiscation of private
property; the reduction of wages to below the minimum needed for survival; and attempts
to nationalize major businesses and agriculture. Id.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Rumbaut, supra note 58, at 235-36.
65. Hwang, supra note 59, at 91.
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The U.S. is not just responsible for the forced exodus of refugees
immediately following its evacuation from Vietnam in 1975. Rather, its
responsibility for uprooting Southeast Asian lives extends to those indi-
viduals who migrated to the U.S. throughout the 1980s and 90s as well.
From 1980 to 1990, roughly 412,500 Vietnamese came to the U.S. as
refugees, as did 133,768 people from Cambodia, and 163,919 from Laos.66
These individuals were affected by the war and had their prewar lives de-
stroyed just like those who had the privilege or luck to flee during the
first wave of immigration. Many of these later refugees and immigrants,
left behind in their war-torn and now hostilely run countries, led lives of
poverty, separation from family, and political harassment by the new re-
gimes. They would have emigrated earlier, but were restricted either by
barriers imposed by the new Communist governments or by quotas en-
acted by the United States. Concerned with the ad hoc nature of the
government's refugee policy, Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act,
which placed ceilings on the number of refugees that could be admitted
to the U.S. each year. In 1980, President Carter reserved 169,000 places
for Southeast Asia. By 1985, the total number of spaces reserved for all
refugees dropped to 70,000, with 50,000 reserved for all of East Asia.68
This number for East Asian refugees stabilized around 50,000 to 52,000
up and through 1992.69 Thus, although there was a large demand among
Southeast Asians for entry into the United States as refugees, caps created
by the United States government significantly limited the supply of spots
available each year.
The ability of Southeast Asians dislocated by the war to enter the
U.S. was also hindered by disagreements between the State Department
66. See Rumbaut, supra note 58, at 241.
67. BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING AsiAN AMERIcA THROUGH IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY, 1850-1990 126-27 (1993). Prior to the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the
attorney general had the ability to "parole" into the U.S. any alien seeking to emigrate to
America for "emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." Id. at
124. This parole authority stemmed from the McCarran-Walter Act enacted by Congress
in 1952. Between 1975 and 1980, the attorney general used this authority to allow over
400,000 Southeast Asian refugees to enter the country. Id.
68. Id. at 127. A strong restrictionist wave bent on limiting the number of Southeast
Asian refugees and immigrants accepted into the United States began to gain strength and
political clout throughout the 19 80s. These restrictionists included INS District Director
Joseph Sureck, several members of Congress, members of the Office of Management and
Budget and the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice. These individuals listed the costs of maintaining a
large refugee program, the overcrowding of public schools and medical facilities, public
health concerns, and the threat that Southeast Asian refugees posed to the established la-
boring classes as reasons for limiting the rates of acceptance. Their advocacy resulted in the
Reagan administration's reduction of the number of Southeast Asians admitted into the
United States by 75% of the number admitted in 1980. See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra
note 57, at 198-205.
69. See HING, supra note 67, at 127.
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and the lmnigration and Naturalization Service (INS) over who qualified
as a refugee for admission under the language of the 1980 Refugee Act. A
large debate erupted over whether individual Southeast Asian emigrants
were political refugees or merely "economic migrants," uncovered by the
1980 legislation.7 0 As a consequence of this discourse, thousands of emi-
grants had to wait for years before gaining entry into the U.S., while
many others never even got this chance. Between 1981 and 1982, the re-
jection rate ofVietnamese boat people living in first asylum refugee camps
in Hong Kong rose from 20% to 65%.7' In another example, in April of
1982, the INS vetoed the acceptance of 23,000 Cambodian emigrants
living in holding centers in Thailand even though these individuals had
worked for the U.S. government or had close relatives in the U.S., and
had already been told that they were accepted for entry and bound for
72America.
Due to the above discussed restrictions, many Southeast Asians who
needed to flee to the U.S. had no choice but to stay and continue to be
persecuted in their home countries or live in squalid refugee camps in
nations of first asylum such as Malaysia and Thailand. These refugee camps
were poorly maintained, and had high levels of crime and violence, add-
ing to the trauma of those already weakened by the war. 73 Many refugees
died within these camps. The U.S. government is responsible for the up-
rooting and emigration of these refugees who entered its borders
throughout the 1980s and 90s in addition to those who emigrated in the
mid to late 70s.
Included amongst those uprooted by the consequences of war have
been thousands of young children, many of which were orphaned
through abandonment or separation during the chaos of battle and
evacuation. For example, a large number of Amerasian youths-the off-
70. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 57, at 200.
71. Id. at 206.
72. Id. at 205.
73. Many Southeast Asians initially escaped the horrors of war by fleeing to
countries/territories of first asylum such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. Within these
countries/territories, they were held in overcrowded and unsafe refugee camps where they
waited, some for several years, for the opportunity to gain entry into a permanent host
nation. A camp was set up in the Philippines by the U.S. government as well for the
purpose of educating Southeast Asian refugees who were accepted for entry into America.
Life within these refugee centers was hard and dangerous. One Vietnamese youth
described the camp in the Philippines in the following manner: "It was so chaotic, so
disordered in the camp. The camp lacked policemen, its security system was bad, therefore
people kept slaughtering one another. A small problem would be blown up to lead to a
fight." Smith and Tarallo, supra note 30, at 67. Indeed, one commentator has noted that due
to their time in refugee camps: "When many refugees from Vietnam reach our shores they
have undergone trials worse than any in any American prison. They have seen the worst
that life can deliver, and because of their experiences of the past years expect and look
forward to nothing." DAVE, supra note 35, at 248.
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spring of American servicemen and Southeast Asian women74-left be-
hind by their fathers, spent the years immediately following the war living
in the streets in makeshift shelters while earning money by selling gum,
75
cigarettes, and candy Other abandoned youths, who managed to escape
to refugee camps, had to quickly learn how to fend for themselves, and
obtain food and shelter, in an environment of distrust. Researchers who
visited a refugee camp in Hong Kong as recently as 1991 described the
situation for Southeast Asian youths in the following manner:
The children showed the greatest effects; they were pale, un-
dersized for their age, listless, and lethargic. They lived in a
world of physical violence, drugs, prostitution, teenage preg-
nancies and sexual abuse, abortions, and depression. Most of
them received little or no education or job training. They were
lonely and anxious over an uncertain future.... They lived in
an emotionally starved environment with little or no parental
or adult guidance. 6
Many of these youths within the refugee camps joined gangs for protec-
tion and survival." Thus, they arrived in the United States already jaded
by their experiences and familiar with lives of crime and violence.
B. The State's Role in Creating and Perpetuating the Socioeconomic
Deprivation of Southeast Asians in America
After initiating a war that led to the dislocation and forced emigra-
tion of hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians, the U.S. government
provided some initial aid to help the refugees that it accepted within its
borders transition to their lives in a new country. This initial sense of obli-
gation, however, soon gave way to a wave of conservative politics
regarding both immigrants and the poor in the U.S. that has continued
from the early 1980s up until the present. Thus, not only did the state cre-
ate the conditions that forced countless Southeast Asians to come to the
United States as refugees, but it also provided a relatively cold welcome
for these emigrants, offering limited amounts of aid that did not even
come close to what was necessary to help a poor community without
74. In addition to their poverty, the bi-racial identity of Amerasians, and particularly
their half American genes, caused these youths to suffer from racial discrimination and
ostracism in their postwar homelands. See HING, supra note 67, at 128. To many, they were
considered "the lowest of the low," especially those with African American fathers. DAYE,
supra note 35, at 247.
75. CHUNG HOANG CHUONG & LEVAN, THE AMERASIANS FROM VIETNAM: A CALiFOR-
NIA STUDY 5-6 (1994).
76. FEEMAN & NGUYEN, supra note 62, at 22.
77. DAYE, supra note 35, at 248.
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English language skills, and often without formal educational back-
grounds, successfully adapt to life in America. It is not surprising then that
many Southeast Asians in the U.S. were forced into lives of deprivation
carried out in criminogenic communities throughout the nation.
Beginning from the early 1980s, the U.S. has consistently cut back
on the amount of government aid that it is willing to provide for recently
arrived refugees and immigrants from Southeast Asia, much to the detri-
ment of these individuals. Professor Bill Hing provides an excellent
account of this pattern and its effects:
Under the 1980 Refugee Act, refugees were given 36-month
stipends of special refugee cash, medical assistance programs,
and other support services. But in 1982 amendments to the act
reduced the stipends to 18 months to pressure refugees to be-
come economically independent more quickly.... Most
refugees are unable to acquire the skills that would qualify
them for anything other than minimum wage jobs in 18
months.... Restrictions on federal assistance thus help to ac-
count for increased Vietnamese American concentration in
entry-level, minimum wage jobs requiring little formal educa-
tion or mastery of English.
7 8
Almost all of the Vietnamese emigrants who came to the United
States after the first wave, mostly South Vietnamese government personnel
and other members of the educated and professional classes, were poor,
unfamiliar with English, and lacked formal education. 79 Emigrants from
Laos and Cambodia shared similar characteristics. Without employable
skills or a reserve of economic resources to holdover on, most Southeast
Asian refugees depended on government assistance in order to support
their families. Once this assistance ended, refugees working minimum
wage jobs or as undocumented laborers quickly fell deeper into poverty,
with little hope for upward mobility. Conservative discourse during the
1980s lamenting the development of the "welfare queen" and dependency
on government handouts by the urban poor served as the driving force
behind reforms that reduced the amount of government assistance avail-
able to refugees. Though they meant to encourage Southeast Asians
receiving public assistance to find work, the amendments to the 1980
Refugee Act. functioned only to doom the Southeast Asian emigrant
population to perpetual lives in poverty.
To make things even worse, the place of residence for Vietnamese
and other Southeast Asian refugees brought into the U.S. under official
resettlement policies was initially determined by the need of resettlement
78. HING, supra note 67, at 137.
79. Rumbaut, supra note 58, at 233.
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agencies to find available and inexpensive housing.80 As such, the govern-
ment originally placed many Southeast Asians into low-income
neighborhoods,8' which were congested and often crime-infested, 2 where
access to quality public schools and jobs was unlikely, as was the possibility
for economic advancement. Indeed, rather than having access to quality
schools and jobs, Southeast Asian refugees were often placed into
neighborhoods rife with racial tension, and in the more extreme cases,
exposed to toxic waste (Richmond, California) and homes without heat
813or glass windows (West Philadelphia).
As a consequence of this government neglect, by 1985 roughly 50%
of all Southeast Asian refugees were living below the poverty line, and by
1987, 64% of Southeast Asian households headed by refugees arriving
after 1980 were on welfare.84 Southeast Asian emigrants fled their home-
lands in order to escape lives of war-induced poverty and persecution
only to immediately begin new lives of extreme deprivation in the
United States. By the start of the 1990s, things still had not improved
much, as over 90% of the Southeast Asian community lived in urban areas
and over 80% of those who actually obtained jobs worked in the service
or blue-collar sectors due to limitations of language classes, job training,
and other programs. 8' In 1994,Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians had
the highest welfare dependency rate of any racial group in the country.8 6
Throughout the 1990s and up until today, the U.S. government has
not improved on the way that it welcomes Southeast Asian emigrants into
its borders. Instead, it has even enacted legislation harmful to Southeast
Asians.Welfare reform during the mid-1990s has removed much needed
benefits for many legal residents and other, more vulnerable immigrant
communities.87 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportumity Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996 proposed to save roughly $23.8 billion by
"denying basic food, shelter, medical care, and old age/disability benefits
to lawful immigrants even though they constituted only five percent of
the total population of welfare recipients., 8 It did so by limiting access to
government benefits to only those immigrants who fell under one of
three enumerated exceptions. 89 Many Southeast Asian emigrants either do
not qualify for any of these exceptions or, more commonly, face a number
80. Bankston and Zhou, supra note 44, at 350.
81. Id.
82. Tan, supra note 5.
83. Tram Nguyen, Unsettled Refugees, COLORLINES, (2001), available at http://
www.arc.org/C-Lines/CLArchive/story4_3_02.html.
84. HING, supra note 67, at 137.
85. Id. at 138.
86. DAYE, supra note 35, at 248.
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of challenges in trying to prove their qualification.9 ° Without the ability to
access government assistance, these particularly vulnerable refugees and
immigrants are left with few resources to carve out a decent life outside
of poverty.
Even for the Southeast Asians who do qualify for government bene-
fits-naturalized citizens and exempted legal residents-the Welfare
Reform Act threatens to eliminate a much needed source of financial
support. By limiting the amount of money available to welfare recipients,
the U.S. government has forced an increasing number of people off of the
welfare roles but into a deeper state of poverty. This trend has occurred
both within the general population and within the Southeast Asian com-
munity.9 Many Southeast Asians, pressured by reform deadlines to find
any sort of employment, have been forced to take on jobs below their
skill levels as well as forego opportunities to pursue an education.92 Most
of these dead-end jobs pay only minimum wage and have no insurance
benefits.93 As such, large potentials of human capital have been stunted
and prevented from manifesting due to the enforcement of federal legisla-
tion. Welfare reform has not created an incentive for Southeast Asians to
seek employment and develop self-sufficiency. Rather, it has predestined a
community-uprooted by war and welcomed into the U.S. by poor pub-
lic schools, racial discrimination, low-income housing, and minimum
wage jobs-to lives of deprivation. It is this sad reality that drove one
Southeast Asian youth living in a housing project in the Bronx to remark:
"The government is not helping the poor at all. It's just punishing the
poor. My dad helped (the U.S.) in the war.... The government should
help us instead of punishing us more." '
The greatest irony of the welfare reforms aimed at immigrants is
that the rhetoric behind their enactment claims that immigrants are
"morally undeserving" of government benefits because they have not
contributed enough to American society.9 Sadly, this polemical discourse
does not take into consideration the fact that most Southeast Asian emi-
grants are living in the United States as a direct consequence of the U.S.
government's waging of a war that destroyed their former homelands. In-
90. For an excellent discussion on the three exemptions, the challenges that immi-
grants must overcome to prove their qualification for one of them, and the despair that
many Southeast Asians experienced upon learning about the welfare reforms, see id. at 95-
97.
91. PuengVongs, Welfare 'Reform' Hinders Success-Oriented Southeast Asian Immigrants,





95. See Hwang, supra note 59, at 102.
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deed, it seems evident that the U.S. government is morally compelled to
take care of its Southeast Asian community. At the very least, the govern-
ment has a moral obligation to provide Southeast Asian emigrants with
the means to lead lives outside of poverty and away from criminogenic
environments. Through its lack of adequate refugee aid programs as well
as its cutting back of welfare benefits, both to specific groups of immi-
grants and to the country's poor in general, the state has failed to fulfill
this moral obligation.
As a consequence of this failure, the Southeast Asian population in
the U.S. continues to suffer from high levels of economic and social hard-
ship. The 2000 Census reports that 22.5% of Cambodians, Laotians, and
Hmong are living in poverty and roughly 10% receive public assistance.
96
This dependency on government aid is the highest out of all racial and
ethnic groups, including Blacks and Latinos, two groups commonly por-
trayed as forming the bulk of America's "underclass:" The numbers for the
Vietnamese are slightly better, reflecting a drastic improvement in the so-
cioeconomic condition of many Vietnamese Americans throughout the
90s, but still reveal enduring socioeconomic struggles as 13.8% of Viet-
namese respondents are living in poverty while 4.8% receive public
assistance.97 Perhaps the most alarming statistics for the Southeast Asian
community are those related to educational attainment and English profi-
ciency, for these two areas are the keys to helping Southeast Asians attain
well-paid jobs and achieve upward mobility. By the year 2000, 52.5% of
Cambodians, Hmong and Laotians had less than a high school education,
44.3% lacked a proficiency in English, and only 9.2% had college de-
grees.98 These education and language statistics were the worst out of all
Asian ethnic groups, as well as all racial categories recorded by the Census.
Meanwhile, a no less concerning 40.4% ofVietnamese reported a lack of
English proficiency and 37.8% had not graduated from high school.99 The
impoverished backgrounds of the Southeast Asian emigrants who have
96. See C.N. Le, Socioeconomic Statistics & Demographics, ASIAN-NATION: THE LAND-
SCAPE OF ASIAN AMERICA, Jan. 23, 2006, available at http://www.asian-nation.org/
demographics.shtml. Some observers have noted that Southeast Asians in certain regions
have been provided with a strong support system by local aid agencies, which has enabled
them to achieve significant amounts of success. One reporter for the Washington Times has
written: "The majority of Hmong have prospered in the United States, gaining elective
office or becoming successfiul entrepreneurs. In this part of the heartland [Minnesota], they
have benefited from the open-hearted nature of locals." Miller, supra note 21.The contem-
porary socioeconomic data on Southeast Asians presented in this section, however, strongly
invalidate such claims. Even in the state of Minnesota, poverty remains a serious problem
for many members of the Southeast Asian community. Art Hughes, Census: Poverty Still
A Problem For Some Minorities, MINN. PUB. RADIO, Sept. 25, 2002, http://
news.minnesota.pubhcradio.org/features/200209/25-hughesa-census/.
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continued to come to the United States throughout the 1990s accounts
for these troubling statistics, as do America's inadequate public schools
within low-income neighborhoods and the lack of quality programs de-
signed to facilitate refugee and immigrant adjustment to this country. Low
levels of educational achievement and weak language skills are particularly
troubling because most Southeast Asians will not be able to establish
themselves economically, and thus avoid lives in criminogenic environ-
ments, until they acquire the skills and credentials needed to land good
jobs outside of the manual labor and blue collar areas.
Of course, not all Southeast Asians lead lives of deprivation, and not
all of those who have been placed or are living in criminogenic environ-
ments end up doing poorly in school or have trouble obtaining financial
stability. There have been success stories just as there have been struggles.
A number of more established Southeast Asians, particularly the Vietnam-
ese, have opened their own small businesses such as restaurants and nail
salons. °1 They have used these enterprises, built up through years of hard
work, to achieve upward mobility. This business success helps explain the
improvement in poverty levels and family incomes among Vietnamese
Americans between 1990 and 2000. The key, though, is to realize that
many Laotians, Hmong, and Cambodians have not had as much small
business success as the Vietnamese, and that even among the Vietnamese,
the successes of part of the community only mask the extreme difficulties
and poverty of another significant part of the community. Even for those
who do manage to achieve economic stability, this usually takes a number
of years to achieve during which their families-children, brothers and
sisters, nieces and nephews-remain vulnerable and exposed to the chal-
lenges of life in criminogenic environments.
Some might also argue that the education and employment statistics
reported for Southeast Asians by the 2000 Census do not accurately re-
flect the future prospects for the Southeast Asian community. It is a fair
observation to note that as more and more Southeast Asians are born and
raised in the United States, and thus have the strong language skills
100. From 1990 to 1993, 42.6% of immigrants coming into the United States re-
ported their employment prior to arrival as "laborer." Another 29.7% came from service
backgrounds and 23.1% worked in crafts. Meanwhile, only 1.3% ofVietnamese immigrants
had managerial backgrounds, and only 1.3% and 2.1% came from professional and techni-
cal backgrounds. UCLA ASIAN AMERICAN STUDIES CENTER, 1998-99 NATIONAL ASIAN
PACIFIC AMERICAN POLITICAL ALMANAC 84 (8th ed. 1999).
101. According to Cynthia Drummey, editor-in-chief of Nails magazine, the trade
journal for nail salons, roughly 50% of the nation's manicurists are ofVietnamese descent.
Many Vietnamese have entered this business because it does not demand the formal edu-
cation and English language proficiency that most well-paying jobs require. As recently as
1998, the salon services market in the U.S. was worth $6.4 billion.Janet Dang, A Hand For
Vietnamese Americans: Discount Nail Salons Bring Success To Their Fingertips, AsIANWEEK, Nov.
25, 1999, http://www.asianweek.com/1999_11_25/feature_nails.html.
[VOL. 11:671
Evaluation of Southeast Asian Criminal Responsibility 693
needed to succeed within the classrooms, an increasing number of South-
east Asians will attain college degrees and well-paid jobs. This argument
assumes that the current statistics on Southeast Asians over-represent the
foreign-born population and thus mask large amounts of current and po-
tential educational and professional success. Indeed, some studies have
found that Southeast Asian, and particularly Vietnamese American, chil-
dren have had a great deal of success in American primary and secondary
schools. One of these studies that included over 1,300 Southeast Asian
students-Vietnamese, Laotian, and ethnic Chinese-from all over the
country reported that 27% had a grade point average in the "A" range,
52% in the "B" range, while only 4% had below a "C" average.1
0 2
In reality, though, the academic success of a portion of the young
Southeast Asian community only works to conceal the academic and
employment struggles of many others, particularly because the accom-
plishments of those who have been successful only contribute to the myth
of the model minority. This is true both for the Southeast Asian commu-
nity as a whole, and among the different Southeast Asian ethnic groups as
well.The same author who pointed to the study above as a sign of South-
east Asian academic achievement admits later in his work that there is a
large number of underreported Southeast Asian youths who are facing
academic difficulties.'0 3 Others have noted the extremely high dropout
rates of Southeast Asian high school students.0 4 A 1997 report authored
by the Educational Testing Service (ETS), the group that administers the
SAT I, SAT II, GRE, and Advanced Placement credit examinations, found
that the high school dropout rate for schools with large concentrations of
Southeast Asians hovers around 50 percent.'5 This finding was presented
within a larger article that suggested that the failure of mainstream Amer-
ica and policymakers to recognize the educational and economic struggles
of Southeast Asian students has led to the systematic neglect of a vulner-
able community, and the failure to create much needed programs and
services. These essential services include more vocational and job training
for Southeast Asian youths, assistance with learning English, and parent106
support programs. Crime and gang intervention programs are two other
types of services that would greatly benefit the Southeast Asian commu-
nity but have slipped under the current political radar.
Bankston and Zhou provide evidence of the difficult reality of
many Southeast Asians through their research which demonstrates that
102. Do, supra note 43, at 90.
103. Id. at 96.
104. Educational Testing Service, Stereotyping Shortchanges Asian American Students,
http://www.modelminority.com/printout91.html; C.N. Le, A Closer Look at Asian Ameri-
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Vietnamese youths are moving in two contrary directions with respect to
their interaction with American social and educational life.107 Even while
a large number of Vietnamese Americans have excelled within the class-
rooms, many have not, and have instead developed a wide range of
delinquent behavior, including drug and alcohol use, and having run-ins
with the police.0 8 Youths from other Southeast Asian communities have
often fared even worse as a group than theirVietnamese counterparts. 9
As a consequence of U.S. foreign policy, hundreds of thousands of
Southeast Asians have been displaced and uprooted. As a result of Ameri-
can domestic policy, this same emigrant community has been thrust into a
new country without the proper resources and support necessary to adapt
successfully to life in America. In several ways, the U.S. government is re-
sponsible for a number of the struggles that the Southeast Asian
community is currently facing. But for the actions of the U.S. govern-
ment, many Southeast Asians and the criminal defendants that come from
this community would not be living in criminogenic neighborhoods
across the nation today.
III.THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AND
A DEFENSE OF SOCIETAL FAULT
Based on the historical and current treatment of Southeast Asians by
the U.S. government discussed above, I will now posit that Southeast
Asian defendants who have been significantly influenced by life within
criminogenic environments ought to receive mitigated punishments based
on the partial excuse of societal fault. I will argue that, in many instances,
the state is at least partially responsible for Southeast Asian criminal be-
havior. This is certainly a radical idea when looked at from the perspective
of traditional, but not necessarily accurate, views of human agency and
criminal responsibility. As the following discussion will reveal, however, it
is supported by an honest examination of traditional justifications for
punishment in our society, as well as powerful criminal law and moral
theories proposed by intellectuals such as Professor Richard Delgado and
Judge David Bazelon. Additionally, it accomplishes the critically important
function of harmonizing the rarified and abstract notions underpinning
our system of criminal law with the realities of life and social inequality.
107. Bankston & Zhou, supra note 44, at 343.
108. Id. at 356-57.
109. Tan, supra note 5, at B1.
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A. Toward a True Notion ofjust Deserts: In the Abstract and Applied
Out of the three main theories historically used to justify criminal
punishment--deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution-a strong con-
sensus of criminal law scholars, the retributivist school, has come to
recognize retribution as the primary driving force behind a truly moral
system of criminal justice. " " In addition to criticizing the implications of a
system of punishment based solely on deterrence or rehabilitation, one
retributivist has even argued that the concepts of retribution and just de-
serts underlie and serve as "tacit assumptions" for the moral legitimacy of
the other theories. 11'
The retributivist theory of punishment requires that an individual
be punished only as much as he deserves. 2 This is the so-called just de-
serts doctrine. As a foundational principle of criminal law, retribution
focuses on the moral blameworthiness of a defendant, and establishes the
importance of proportionality when determining what punishment, if any,
an individual deserves for his actions.1 3 According to retributivist theory,




Retributivist conceptions of just deserts, often associated with the
work of Professor Herbert Morris, posit that when an individual has
committed an act proscribed by the community, he has taken unfair ad-
vantage of the agreed-upon sharing of benefits and burdens. " ' The
110. SeeJosHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16-18 (3d ed. 2001). Of
course, the debate between retributivism, utilitarianism, and other theories of criminal
punishment still continues today. Some commentators have even suggested a mixed theory
of punishment. Id. at 19-23.
111. Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437,441-42 (1993). Professor Renteln argues:
I believe the fundamental justification for punishment to be retribution. De-
terrence cannot stand alone, because general deterrence would be achieved
by punishing the innocent. But deterrence is only valid if others are deterred
by the punishment of one who is deserving of it. By like token, rehabilita-
tion only succeeds if the prisoner accepts that he is blameworthy.
Id. at 442.
112. E.g., id.
113. E.g., R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and the
Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459,459-61 (1994).
114. Id.
115. Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 68 (1985). This notion of re-
tributivism advanced by Morris is also referred to as protective retribution, or retribution
based on the principle of personhood. DRESSLER, supra note 110, at 17. It is presented in con-
trast to two other iterations of the retributivist theory--assaultive retribution and victim
vindication. All three forms of retributivism believe in the same underlying principles ofjust
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"wrongdoer [now] owes something to society as a result of renouncing
the burden of self-restraint which others have assumed."116 Justice, gained
through punishing this wrongdoing individual, "restores the equilibrium
of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes; that
is, by exacting the debt."'117
Society, however, loses its ability to punish and to exact a wrong-
doer's debt when it is itself responsible for some or all of the conditions
that have contributed to the wrongdoer's criminogenic behavior. 118 That
is, if the law is to act as a true moral force, it should not convict unless it is
in a position to condemn.1 9 Richard Delgado draws upon this idea with
his advocacy for a Rotten Social Background (RSB) defense. This defense
argues that when society has contributed to the creation or aggravation of
a poor and deprived environment, conducive to the development of
criminal conduct, individuals raised and living in these environments
should not be held completely responsible for their legally proscribed ac-
tions. This argument relies on a number of theoretical and empirical
studies that have identified a correlation between deprivation/poverty and
criminal behavior. These studies identify a host of factors that contribute
to the formation of crirminogenic environments including, amongst oth-
ers, chronic unemployment, substandard living conditions, inadequate
schooling, poor treatment by the police, inadequate homes, and racism.
21
When society is responsible for the creation of any combination of these
factors, or guilty of not taking effective steps to ameliorate them, it should
share part of the blame for criminal acts committed by defendants raised
or living in communities heavily impacted by such factors. Many of these
defendants are forced to live in criminogenic environments due to reasons
deserts and proportionality but use a different analytic framework to defend their position.
Id.
116. Delgado, supra note 115, at 68.
117. HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976).
118. Bazelon, supra note 1, at 388.
119. Id.
120. See Delgado, supra note 115, at 18-20. By using the word "deprived" and refer-
ring to "deprived environments" I do not, in any way, offer a value judgment on the lives
and decisions made by those living in the criminogenic environments discussed through-
out this paper. Indeed, vibrant local cultures and strong social bonds often develop in the
most economically and socially marginalized communities. My reference to the depriva-
tion in such communities is strictly structural.
121. See id. at 23-34. A large body of interesting research continues to demonstrate
the existence of a strong link between different types of crime and various forms of depri-
vation. See, e.g.,Jens Ludwig, Greg J. Duncan & Paul Hirschfield, Urban Poverty and Juvenile
Crime: Evidence from a Randomized Housing-Mobility Experiment, 116 QJ. ECON. 655, 674-
76 (2001); Morgan Kelly, Inequality and Crime, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 530, 530 (2000);
Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban
Crime, 75 Soc. FORCES 619,640-42 (1996).
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outside of their control. Most are born, by chance, into poor families
with histories of inequality, while others are prevented from escaping the
difficulty of lives of deprivation by socially engendered barriers such as
racism and the unavailability of working-class jobs in post-industrial
American society. As a consequence of their difficult life circumstances
and their hyper-exposure to racist and criminal sub-cultures, such defen-
dants often lack the relevant freedom, control, and knowledge necessary
to make them morally, and thus criminally, responsible for their behav-
ior. 124
Delgado and other commentators who have spoken on behalf of the
RSB or other socioeconomic deprivation based defenses, focus primarily
on the lives of African Americans and the plight of Black and ethnic indi-
viduals within urban centers. They criticize the legacy of slavery in
America-racism, poorly educated African American communities, and
high levels of poverty-as well as the government's weak efforts to aid
socially disadvantaged people generally, and conclude that justice demands
that society share some of the blame for criminal offenses committed by
RSB defendants.1 2 - Clearly, though, arguments for a defense based on so-
cietal fault extend to all classes of individuals adversely affected by
government policies, regardless of race or ethnicity. A link to institutional
slavery need not be made, nor would a defense of societal fault presented
on behalf of contemporary African Americans be based principally on the
historical treatment of their community. Rather, the point is that society
has played a role in creating, perpetuating, or ignoring major inequalities
in the U.S., and this has circumscribed its ability to judge and cast blame
on some of its members. The case of Southeast Asian refugees and emi-
grants serves as a powerful example of this phenomenon.
Through its participation in the Vietnam War and its inability to
adequately provide for those dislocated and negatively impacted by this
participation, the U.S. government has diminished its capacity to punish
and cast moral blame. As discussed above, the great majority of Southeast
Asians living in the U.S. are in this country as a consequence of America's
involvement in the Vietnam War. These individuals were literally forced to
122. Wright, supra note 113, at 480.
123. Id. at 481-83. Of course, some individuals live in poverty and have few resources
as a consequence of their own direct actions. This paper stresses, though, that amidst the
conservative backdrop of the 1980s and 90s, it is important not to ignore the large number
of people living in the U.S. who live in deprivation as a consequence of their birth or
despite their efforts to craft a decent lifestyle from their limited means. Unless one is pre-
pared to accept the argument that people are poor because they are lazy, one must open
one's eyes to the realities of the U.S.'s post-industrial capitalist social structure, its legacy of
racial discrimination, as well as the policy shortcomings of the federal and various state
governments when assessing a socio-economically deprived individual's true capacity to
achieve upward mobility.
124. Id. at 482-83.
125. Delgado, supra note 115, at 23-24.
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flee their homelands. Then, after arriving in the U.S., many of these emi-
grants were placed in low-income neighborhoods; received minimal
government aid relative to their poor, uneducated, and war-torn back-
grounds; and have been the victims of government cut-backs and
conservative discourse on welfare dependency and self-sufficiency. As
such, over the years the U.S. government has ushered hundreds of thou-
sands of Southeast Asians into lives of poverty within criminogenic
environments where they have been exposed to a number of different
factors that contribute to the development of criminal behavior. This
helps explain the rising rate of Southeast Asian youth delinquency and
participation in gangs, which were documented in the studies conducted
by Kent and Felkenes as well as Bankston and Zhou. Thus, when a South-
east Asian from one of these criminogenic environments breaks the law,
he is entitled to draw upon a defense based on societal fault and force
society to take responsibility for its contribution to the factors that helped
lead to his criminal behavior. Put another way, the state must account for
its role in making the Southeast Asian defendant's choice to obey the law
much harder than the same choice for a member of a less economically
and socially marginalized class of individuals. It must account for its af-
firmative role in placing certain groups at a disadvantage with regard to
the criminal law and its application.
When examining the case of Southeast Asian defendants, it is helpful
to keep the wise and ultimately simple words of Judge Bazelon in mind.
Bazelon notes that in order for the criminal law to make a truly moral
decision on an individual's degree of criminal responsibility, it must de-
termine that "society's own conduct in relation to the actor entitles it to
sit in condemnation of him.... 026 This is to say that, in certain situations,
the discussion on blameworthiness and culpability ought to shift away
from the individual defendant or defendants, such as in cases involving
environmental deprivation. In such cases, the focus ought to be on society,
the system of criminal law that it uses to render justice, and its moral pre-
rogative, if any, to punish and cast blame onto others. A truly moral legal
system does not punish those whose lives and choices it has circumscribed
as a result of its foreign and domestic policy. As Bazelon explains:
In my opinion, it is simply unjust to place people in dehuman-
izing social conditions, to do nothing about those conditions,
and then to command those who suffer, 'behave-or else!' ...
We cannot produce a class of desperate and angry citizens by
closing off, for many years, all means of economic advance-
126. Bazelon, supra note 1, at 388.
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ment and personal fulfillment for a sizeable part of the popula-
tion, and thereafter expect a crime-free society.
27
B. Mitigation Rather Than Exoneration:
Societal Fault as a Partial Excuse
The societal fault defense introduced above and its application to
the Southeast Asian defendant must be further refined in order to justify
its existence. Additionally, the construction of a more refined theory helps
to better delegitimize the current state of the law as it relates to individu-
als from criminogenic environments.
In order to allow for truly individualized justice, the criminal law
must create space for a middle ground between the traditional binary of
complete innocence and absolute culpability.128 Some commentators who
have suggested complete exculpation for criminal acts based on a pure
environmental determinist theory do a wonderful job highlighting the
moral issue surrounding the punishment of defendants affected by crimi-
nogenic environments. At the same time, though, they propose an
impractical and theoretically imprecise solution. For example, drawing on
classical liberal theories of social contract, a number of theorists argue that
societies are formed upon a system of mutuality.1 29 As such, they posit that
"if some segments of society are deprived of the benefits of the 'social
contract they are also excused from the obligations imposed upon them
by it.' ' 130 Similarly, Delgado draws an analogy between his RSB defense
and the existing defense of entrapment. He notes that under the rules of
entrapment, "when a government agent is responsible for the defendant's
mens rea, criminal punishment is inappropriate. 13'  However attractive,
these theoretical models discussed by Delgado and others, when taken to
their logical extremes, would lead to the mass acquittals of thousands of
individuals a year. This is an impractical result that community members,
even sympathetic ones, would almost certainly reject. 3 2 More importantly,
mass exculpations would not lead to the most accurate or just results ei-
ther. The cases in this discussion involve defendants who have actually
committed the actus reus of certain criminal offenses, and strictly speaking,
with the proper mens rea as well. A defendant who has grown up in pov-
erty and steals out of both necessity and pent up frustration caused by
unfair living conditions, has nevertheless committed the proscribed act of
127. Id. at 401-02.
128. See Renteln, supra note 111, at 443.
129. Delgado, supra note 115, at 14.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 77.
132. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
CAL. L. REV. 943,962 (1999).
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stealing with the intention of doing so. Thus, the defendant still retains
some degree of blameworthiness for his actions. Most people choose their
behavior, no matter how difficult these choices are, and should thus be
held accountable for their actions.13 It is the degree of culpability of a
defendant that this discussion calls into question, not the complete lack of
it. Full exculpation is not the correct remedy in cases of environmental
deprivation, and would lead to a disproportionately lenient outcome.
While societal fault and contribution to criminogenic environments
should not serve as a complete defense to criminal behavior, they should
act as a partial excuse. When society shares part of the blame for a defen-
dant's actions, the defendant ought to receive either a mitigated
conviction or a reduction in his punishment. z4 This would allow for the
true fulfillment of the retributivist goals ofjust deserts and proportionality.
A distinction must be drawn between moral guilt and legal guilt.' 3 Even
though a defendant's actions may meet the actus reus and mens rea re-
quirements for a proscribed act, thus making him legally guilty of a crime,
this does not necessarily mean that he is also completely morally guilty as
well. The state must share some of the moral guilt with the actor for fail-
ing to provide him with the proper resources and life chances to avoid
turning to crime. Put another way, the state must share part of the moral
guilt of a defendant when it is responsible for making the choices and
opportunities to conform to the law much harder for individuals from
criminogenic environments than for individuals from other communi-
ties.
13 6
133. Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology:A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49
S. CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1252 (1976).
134. In theory just deserts demands that defendants who successfully launch a socie-
tal fault defense receive a mitigated conviction or sentence because they do not bear the
full moral blame for their proscribed conduct. In practice, though, the best place to work
the distinction between moral and legal guilt, and a defense based on societal fault, into
the current system of criminal law is in the sentencing phase of a trial. One reason for this
is that downward adjustment of a conviction (as opposed to a sentence) would tend to be
arbitrary and stunt the definitional goals of the relevant penal code. Strictly speaking, de-
fendants would be convicted of an offense that they did not commit and get off for one
that they did. These lesser convictions, then, would really only be operating as a proxy for
shortened sentences or alternative forms of punishment. Thus, the more direct, and per-
haps most pragmatic, way of providing for just deserts is to seek mitigated punishment
during the sentencing phase rather than the liability phase of trial.
135. Renteln, supra note 111, at 443. Professor Renteln discusses the need for a mid-
die ground between moral and legal guilt within the context of her argument in favor of
an officially recognized cultural defense and the recognition of the role of motive in de-
termining criminal liability. Although she does not directly discuss defenses based on
societal fault, her distinction between the different types of culpability are clearly applica-
ble to the arguments presented in this paper.
136. It is prudent to note here that the United States does not have a tradition of
recognizing a defendant's socioeconomic background or life within a criminogenic
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A nice way to conceptually view this argument is by analyzing cases
involving defendants influenced by societal neglect along the same lines as
civil law cases of contributory negligence. 137 In a societal fault model, as
with most contributory negligence schemes, the fault associated with a
specific incident is divided between all of the parties involved according
to the extent of each party's contribution. Under this framework, a defen-
dant is partially exonerated if he can show that criminogenic
environmental conditions resulted in his criminal act and that these con-
ditions are chargeable to society.138 Retributivist and individualized justice
are served through this approach, as the defendant is found culpable to the
true extent that he deserves-no more, and no less. By allowing for a so-
cietal fault defense, and for the mitigated convictions and/or punishments
of the individuals qualified for its use, analyses of criminal responsibility
properly shift away from only examining the defendant and also take a
good look at the role of the state in creating environments of neglect as
well.
With the specific example of Southeast Asians, a defendant could es-
tablish a partial defense of societal fault in several different ways. He can
point to any of the issues discussed throughout this Note such as resettle-
ment by the government within poor and crime-stricken neighborhoods,
limited educational and employment opportunities, and insufficient
amounts of refugee and general welfare aid to implicate the U.S. govern-
ment as a contributor to his criminal behavior.
C. Addressing Potential Criticisms
It would be prudent here to examine some of the possible objections
that could be leveled against a defense of societal fault. Accordingly, in what
follows, I will lay out and respond to two different sets of critiques. First, I
environment as mitigating factors during sentencing. In fact, multiple sections of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines specifically prohibit consideration of such environmental
factors by judges. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
5 5H1.12 (Nov. 2004) ("[L]ack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating
a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds in determining whether a departure
[from the otherwise prescribed level of punishment] is warranted.").
Such rules, however, do not affect the moral strength behind a defense based on so-
cietal fault. Moreover, several countries, including Sweden and Canada, do allow for the
use of environmental deprivation-type defenses as a means to mitigate an individual's sen-
tence. See The Swedish Penal Code, ch.29 5 3(3) (Regeringskansliet 1999) (allowing for
mitigation in cases where "the actions of the accused were connected with his manifestly
deficient development, experience or capacity for judgment"); Canadian Criminal Code,
Part XXIII 5 718.2(a) (Thomson & Carswell 2005) (enumerating five specific aggravating
factors but placing no limits on what can constitute a mitigating factor). This suggests that
such a defense is, in fact, practical and perhaps not as radical as some critics might feel.
137. Delgado, supra note 115, at 89.
138. Id.
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will address criticisms based on notions of human agency. Second, I will
respond to a number of challenges raised by Supreme Court Justice Cla-
rence Thomas in one of his past publications discussing punishment and
the implications of a societal fault defense. In doing all of this, I will dis-
cuss both abstract principles and also provide concrete examples through
the Southeast Asian case study that I have been examining throughout
this Note.
1. Agency Critique
In opposition to the criminal defense proposed above, it has been
argued by Professor Stephen Morse that a person's behavior is a matter of
harder choices and easier choices, but that behavior is still always a matter
of choice and individual agency.' 39 This line of thought posits that the en-
vironment is not all-determinative, pointing out that the majority of
persons in the most criminogenic subcultures follow the law, while many
people living in more privileged positions choose to break the law.'40
Thus, individuals should be held responsible for all of their actions even if
they grew up or live in conditions statistically shown to lead to criminal
behavior. As Herbert Packer, another criminal law scholar has explained,
"We regard those [environmental] constraints [on an individual's actions]
as too remote to justify an excuse on the ground that the person could
not have helped acting as he did."'
14'
However, even if growing up in a criminogenic environment does
not in and of itself make an individual completely irresponsible for any
criminal acts that he might commit, justice still requires that the state
mitigate his conviction or criminal sentence in order to accomplish the
retributivist goal of providing just deserts.142 Society's contribution to
criminogenic environments sharply limits its moral right to punish, as it is
really partially responsible for the criminal acts of a defendant influenced
by such an environment. It is true, as Morse argues, that some choices in
life will always be harder than others. It is easier to refrain from commit-
ting robbery when one is rich and not poor. It is easier not to attack an
individual for using a racial slur when one has never experienced racial
discrimination than when one has grown up as a racial minority and ex-
perienced the various abuses of racism from an early age. 4 3 When the
139. Morse, supra note 133, 1252.
140. Id.
141. Delgado, supra note 115, at 55.
142. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
CAL. L. REV. 943,962 (1999).
143. In some instances, the established criminal law has even recognized and accepted
this reality of easier and harder choices, as reflected by the provocation (reasonable heat of
passion) excuse, which allows for the mitigation and partial relief of criminal responsibility.
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government and society are to blame for creating the factors that make
the choice to adhere to legally accepted norms of behavior significantly
harder for one class of individuals than for another, though, they ought to
take responsibility for this contribution. Punishing an individual com-
pletely for a criminal act he committed, in part because of his social
conditioning within an environment of deprivation created or perpetu-
ated by society, would violate the retributivist principle of proportionality.
The defendant would be punished more than justice demands.
This idea is consistent with the philosophy of soft determinism. Soft
determinists posit that although human actions are caused, they are not
compelled.14 That is, while people usually retain some degree of agency
and control over their actions, their ability to conform to the law and to
make choices consistent with socially sanctioned codes of conduct can
oftentimes be compromised or made much harder due to contact with
various types of external restraints. As such, situations arise where an
individual's actions, while not compelled by environmental factors, are
nevertheless rendered not completely free either. 146 In these cases, it might
not be fair to hold such an individual 100% liable for his criminal con-
duct, particularly if the state is responsible for creating or perpetuating the
external constraints that made the existence of a set of truly free choices
unavailable to the defendant.
This discussion need not remain in the abstract. Much research on
the Southeast Asian community has illustrated the very real ways that en-
vironments can affect an individual's agency. This research reveals that, for
many Southeast Asians, and especially Southeast Asian youths living in
criminogenic environments, it is often much easier to conform to local
pro-crime norms than to the dictates of the law.'41 In the study conducted
by Bankston and Zhou, the authors found that the limited opportunity
structures and strong presence of criminal sub-cultures in several South-
east Asian neighborhoods contributed significantly to the choice by the
community's youth to behave antisocially and commit crimes. 48 For these
youths, their circumscribed educational and professional opportunities, as
well as their early and consistent exposure to criminal elements, make it
difficult for them to refrain from deciding to break the law.
144. DREssLER, supra note 110, at 16-17 n.19.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Kent & Felkenes, supra note 43 (discussing the social and environmental
roots of Southeast Asian gang activity).
148. See Bankston & Zhou, supra note 44, at 347.
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2. Drawing Boundaries, Lowered Standards, and Human Dignity
In addition to the potential agency critique of a societal fault de-
fense, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has raised a number of
concerns, including one about the ability to define and limit the class of
individuals that would be qualified to use such a defense. He argues:
Once our legal system [has] accepted the general premise that
social conditions and upbringing could be excuses for harmful
conduct, the range of cases that might prevent society from
holding anyone accountable for his actions become potentially
limitless. Do we punish a drunk driver who has a family his-
tory of alcoholism? A bigoted employer reared in a
segregationist environment, who was taught that blacks are in-
ferior? A thief or drug pusher who was raised in a
dysfunctional family and who received a poor education? ...
Which of these individuals, if any, should be excused for their
conduct?
149
Although Justice Thomas' comment raises some legitimate concerns,
he conflates cases based on the moral strength of societal fault with cases
that lack this crucial factor. A defendant cannot just point to any set of
social conditions that have influenced his upbringing, blame these condi-
tions for his behavior, and expect to be exonerated for breaking the law.
Rather, he must establish the presence of societal fault and some form of
direct societal contribution to the creation of a criminogenic environ-
ment that has influenced his life and worldview, as well as society's role in
placing him into, or erecting barriers to his exit from, such an environ-
ment. This is what distinguishes some hard choices to refrain from
committing legally proscribed acts from others. For example, a White su-
premacist, with similar attitudes to the bigoted employer referred to by
Justice Thomas above, might argue that it is extremely difficult for him
not to commit crimes such as robbery, arson, or homicide when these
actions involve Black or other non-White victims. He might argue that
even though he recognizes that these acts are prohibited by state and fed-
eral law, his hatred toward non-White individuals is so strong that
sometimes he cannot help himself While this hypothetical individual can
definitely point to his upbringing in a segregated community whose val-
ues conditioned him at an early age to maintain racist attitudes to explain
his criminal conduct, he cannot, with any real legitimacy, blame society
and the state for this upbringing. The link between this hypothetical indi-
149. Clarence Thomas, Crime and Punishment-And Personal Responsibility, in CRiMI-
NAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 948 (Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J.
Schulhofer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
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vidual's guilt in committing any of the above described crimes and any
degree of societal fault is far too tenuous to allow for mitigated culpability
based on the sharing of blame.
Society's contribution to Southeast Asian criminality, on the other
hand, presents a different case, one which implicates a much more direct
role on the part of the U.S. government. The U.S. government contrib-
uted significantly to the event-the Vietnam War-that virtually forced
hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians to flee their homes, many to
the United States. Then, it effectively ensured that these Southeast Asian
refugees and emigrants would lead lives of deprivation within crimino-
genic environments by placing them within economically depressed and
crime-ridden communities. Additionally, it failed to establish effective
English language or job skills training programs, and provided only the
most limited forms of financial assistance to help the transition to life in
America. As such, the U.S. government has played a direct role in creating
a community of individuals whose characteristics have been statistically
shown by social science research to contribute to criminal behavior.
In a different line of argumentation, Justice Thomas contends that a
society that allows for a defendant who commits a harmful act to escape
from punishment actually tends to condone or even endorse such behav-
ior.' -° Moreover, he suggests that a criminal justice system that does not
hold people fully accountable for their harmful actions "treats them as less
than full citizens. " ' He asks: "When we demand something from our
oppressors-more lenient standards of conduct, for example-are we
merely going from a state of slavery to a more deceptive, but equally de-
structive, state of dependency?"'1 2 In making these statements, Justice
Thomas seeks to take the moral imperative away from those who advo-
cate for the reconciliation of criminal and social justice through the
adoption of a societal fault defense. Contrary to Thomas' argument that
society would be condoning and even endorsing harmful conduct by al-
lowing for the use of such a defense, the defense proposed by this Note
would only act as a partial excuse. It does not seek to completely exoner-
ate a defendant who has committed a proscribed act with the proper
mental state required by the law. Rather, it simply wishes to provide for
just deserts by allocating the degree of fault amongst those who deserve
to share responsibility for the behavior of the defendant. The defendant
does not "get away" with his crime. Thus, society does not condone and
certainly does not encourage criminal conduct by choosing to take re-




153. A detailed discussion on the partial nature of a defense based on societal fault
was provided in Part Ill(B), supra.
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Also, despite Justice Thomas' claim that allowing for a societal fault
defense would denigrate the human dignity and autonomy of the defen-
dants involved by not treating them as individuals who are capable of
taking full responsibility for their actions, it is really the way that contem-
porary American society treats its poor and uneducated population, most
of whom live in criminogenic environments, that condemns them to sec-
ond-class citizenship. Moreover, the way that socioeconomic inequalities
currently circumscribe the realistic choices and opportunities available to
the nation's most needy communities certainly does not enhance or pro-
mote any realistic sense of individual autonomy.
Thomas tries to turn the societal fault argument around by saying
that individuals are not truly free and dignified unless they take responsi-
bility for all of their freely made actions. By doing so, he merely tries to
mask the real moral issue: it is time for society to finally take responsibility
for its actions. Individuals using a societal fault defense are not so much
asking to be held to a lower standard, but rather are asking society to fol-
low its own dictates and hold itself to a standard of moral responsibility as
well. In the case of Southeast Asians discussed throughout this Note, de-
fendants are not asking to be accorded special treatment. Instead, they
only ask that society pay closer attention to the factors contributing to
Southeast Asian criminality and take into account the various ways that it
has contributed to the existence or salience of such factors.
D. The Criminal Trial as a Forum for Reform
One final argument in support of a criminal defense based on soci-
ety's contribution to criminogenic environments is that the presentation
of evidence in line with such a defense would draw attention to America's
troubling social problems, including poverty, racism, and delinquency
among ethnic youths.15 4 Most Americans do not understand the complex-
ity of the criminal responsibility issue, nor do they appreciate the
community's degree of responsibility for the criminal acts and for the re-
habilitation of an actor.' 5 Allowing defendants to utilize a defense
premised upon societal fault addresses these problems. With the case of
Southeast Asians, it would help deconstruct the myth of the model mi-
nority and bring into the public conscience the needs of a community
whose struggles in the U.S. have been largely marginalized and ignored.
As Delgado notes, "if the criminal law reflects and reinforces a sys-
tem of morality, then a criminal trial is an obvious and appropriate place
to apply, test, and develop that morality.'' 5 6 Or put another way, the crimi-
154. Delgado, supra note 115, at 21; See Bazelon, supra note 1, at 396.
155. See Bazelon, supra note 1, at 391.
156. Delgado, supra note 115, at 79.
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nal justice system has "first line responsibility" for inquiring into and edu-
cating the public about the intricacies of criminal responsibility and the
various causes of crime.'57 Accordingly, trials should allow for the probing
of issues that reveal to the community the mental agonies and difficult
circumstances that produce antisocial and violent behavior.58 A truly
moral criminal justice system does not aim solely to punish criminal acts
but also to promote social justice as well."5 9 Thus, a powerful reason for
allowing for a criminal defense based upon societal fault is that it would
allow the court and society to take a good look at the community that
they are living in and that they have helped create, either directly or
through inaction. This, in turn, might serve as an impetus for reform.
Use of a societal fault defense can educate the community on the
difficult conditions of those living in criminogenic environments by di-
rectly influencing the jury or judge in a trial, and through public exposure
provided by media coverage of such trials. It can help lead to the ad-
vancement of public policies designed to ameliorate the various problems
plaguing the poor-overcrowded housing, inadequate education, unem-
ployment, and other similar crises. The use of a societal fault defense will
force society to ask itself this difficult question posed by Professor Kadish:
"What policies would the nation be obliged in good conscience to pur-
sue toward ameliorating the criminogenic conditions of life for inner city
offenders in order to make punishing them morally sustainable?"
60
The educational element of a societal fault defense would apply per-
fectly to the struggles of many Southeast Asians. Mainstream society has
often viewed all Asians as a monolithic model minority community. Con-
sequently, most Americans are not fully aware of the plight of a large
segment of the Southeast Asian population living in the U.S. These indi-
viduals often read or hear stories about Asian American academic success.
More rarely do they learn about the rising rates of Southeast Asian juve-
nile arrests over the last decade; the large number of Southeast Asians
living in poverty, struggling in schools, and dependent on limited welfare
assistance; or the growing involvement of Southeast Asian youths in gangs.
While not a perfect solution, permitting defendants to tell their stories
within the courtrooms will allow for the education of at least the local
community where a case has drawn some public attention. As one Laotian
youth intervention worker from Minneapolis has noted: "The Southeast
Asian community is not seen in the newspaper, [or] on TV, so you think
they are OK.They are not OK.'
6'
157. United States v.Alexander, 471 E2d 923,926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
158. Id.
159. See Bazelon, supra note 1, at 385.
160. Kadish, supra note 142, at 962.
161. Taylor, supra note 24, at B6.
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It is discouraging that one of the only ways that Southeast Asians
can make it into the public conscience, and have their community issues
discussed within the media, is through the criminal trial of one of their
members. Nevertheless, if telling the Southeast Asian emigrant experience
through the use of a societal fault defense can serve the purpose of edu-
cating the public, this is just one more reason why it is important to
encourage the use of such a defense among Southeast Asian defendants
and why the criminal law should recognize its validity.
CONCLUSION
The criminal defense discussed in this Note is not, and should not
be viewed as relating only to Southeast Asians. Rather, the Southeast
Asian experience serves as just a prime example of what a strong case of
societal fault would look like. Adding the notion of societal fault into the
determination of an individual's degree of criminal responsibility will af-
fect people from all different groups and communities defined by race,
socioeconomic status, nationality, social geography, and the like. To some
critics, this is the critical flaw with this Note's suggestions and arguments.
The American experience will be a moral failure, though, if it succumbs
to the notion that a defense based on societal fault cannot practically be
implemented because too many people would be able to use it.What sort
of society does such a critique reflect? Simply because a large number of
people could potentially take advantage of a societal fault defense to miti-
gate their punishments does not mean that this defense, or the normative
concepts behind it, should be dismissed. Rather, the best way that the U.S.
can prevent the societal fault defense from ever being used is by providing
more adequately for all Americans' social well being. This is not to say that
everyone living in America ought to be equal in standing and stature; this
Note does not present an argument in favor of a modern day utopia. It
merely suggests that the U.S. needs to do a better job at addressing the
very real problems that millions of Americans suffer from each day, many
of which derive from poverty and the lack of basic resources. A good faith
effort is all that is required. In many instances, however, this simple effort
has not been provided.
In the end, the criminal defense presented here does not just at-
tempt to correct a flaw within the criminal law. Its deeper mission is to
attack and expose the more general problems with American society's
attitude and treatment of its marginalized communities. Today, roughly
35.9 million Americans live in poverty. '1 2 At the same time, the American
162. Ceci Connolly & GriffWitte, Poverty Rate Up 3rd Year In A Row, WASH. POST,
Aug. 27, 2004, at Al.
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prison population has swelled to over 2 million.1 63 One out of every 142
U.S. residents now lives in a prison cell. 164 Despite all of the prosperity
that this country enjoys, much is left to be desired. Both poverty and
prison statistics will only continue to rise unless America decides to finally
address its problems straight on with real solutions, rather than just the
politically exigent ones. Perhaps tending to the issues confronting Amer-
ica's poor and socially deprived will produce a more effective, ex ante,
solution to crime. It would definitely reduce the number of people living
in poverty. Americans need to closely examine the society that they live in
and realize how much better off they could be. At the very least, they
could be living in a community where crime is not such a major issue,
and where more people can live in homes rather than on the streets or
behind bars.
163. "US Prison Total Tops 2 Million," US Gov Info/Resources, http://
usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/aaprisonpop.htm.
164. Id.
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